Question 2, © 2005:
Dr. Ferdinand von Schnauser, a licensed veterinarian, brought an anti-trust suit against the American Medical Society for its monopolizing the medical treatment of human beings. In his suit, he claimed that he was trained and licensed to treat all varieties of animals, and that for thousands of years philosophers and even theologians had defined the human being as a variety of animal – e.g., rational animal, speaking animal, etc. Therefore, he maintained, since human beings essentially are animals, he should be licensed and allowed to treat them.
About the same time as Dr. von
Schnauser’s suit, Mr. Turner Goodwrench, president of P.U. (Plumber’s Union)
brought a similar suit, on behalf of his union against the American Medical
Association. In his suit, the claim was
made that since the human being has been defined as an “ingenious array of
portable plumbing,” plumbers ought to be able to render medical treatment to
human beings.
These two cases come simultaneously before the U.S. Supreme Court. As the Meyer Lansky Professor of Jewish Theology and Ethics at the Bugsy Siegel College of Judaica, you are called as an expert witness to testify at the trial. You are asked by the court for a preliminary statement on the issues which will help the court come to a decision in these two cases. Write such a preliminary statement.
Honorable justices of the Supreme Court:
The two cases before you today are connected by this crucial question: how does one properly define a human being? The arguments presented by Dr. Schnauser and Mr. Goodwrench exemplify two of three classic approaches to the definition of humans which have dominated Western thought for centuries: the zoological approach, which defines humans as a type of animal; the mechanical approach, which defines humans as a type of machine; and the economic approach, which defines humans as a type of economic commodity. Dr. Schnauser defines humans as a type of animal. In this he follows the tradition of Aristotle, who defined humans as “speaking animals.” Many thinkers, including the Jewish thinker Maimonides, have been influenced by Aristotle’s view. Later on, Descartes defined humans as a composite of mind and body, distinguishing them from animals, which only had bodies and were therefore automata or machines. Essentially then Descartes defined humans as animals with minds or souls. Karl Marx and Benjamin Franklin both defined humans as “tool-making animals.”[1]
Mr. Goodwrench, on the other hand, by defining humans as “an ingenious array of portable plumbing,” is following the mechanical approach. Precedents for this view include Julien La Mettrie, successor of Descartes, who said in 1748, “The human body is a machine which winds its own springs.”[2] Robert Ingersoll said in 1872 that “Man is a machine into which we put what we call food, and produce what we call thought. Think of that wonderful chemistry by which bread was changed into the divine tragedy of Hamlet!.”[3] Ingersoll’s optimistic tone is offset by the pessimism expressed by Isak Dinesen in Out of Africa, that the human being is a machine that transforms fine wine into urine.[4]
The third approach to defining humans is the economic approach, chillingly exemplified by the owners of the Auschwitz death camp who said, “All inmates shall be fed, sheltered & treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible expense at the least possible cost.”[5] Though a representative of the economic definition of the human being has not yet come before you, your decision in the cases currently before you will set the precedent for evaluating the economic definition as well. Indeed, as animals and machines can both be economic commodities, those definitions lead naturally to the economic definition. The court thus has a deep responsibility to make a wise decision regarding these two cases, and to set a precedent which honors the dignity and sanctity of all human beings.
Speaking from the perspective of Jewish Theology, I have two things to offer which I believe you will find helpful as you come to a decision. The first is a set of three criteria for evaluating the validity of any definition of a human being. The second is a way of escape from the reductionism of definition, provided by the Biblical and Rabbinic manner of thought, which describes humans rather than defining them, and sees things in terms of composites of complementary polar opposites rather than as reductionistic definitions.
First of all, I believe these three criteria must be used to determine the validity of any definition of a human being:[6]
I. Since by defining humans we are defining ourselves, the definition ought to be acceptable to ourselves. “In any definition of human beings we offer, we must look for ourselves.”[7] Speaking as a human being myself, I do not want to be defined as nor more than an animal, or no more than a machine, and I definitely do not want to be seen as an economic commodity.
II. The moral consequences of the definition need to be acceptable. What is the moral implication of defining humans as “speaking animals,” as even the great Jewish thinker Maimonides has done? Does this mean that people who cannot speak are not human, and thus that killing them is not murder? Some have concluded that. The Nazis called people undermenschen who in many ways did not meet their criteria for humans. People were defined as animals, and were treated as animals. Some have concluded that animals, as automata, feel no pain. This misconception has led to the cruel mistreatment of animals, and even worse, cruelty to humans. The moral consequences of the mechanical definition include the treatment of humans as expendable, as machines are expendable. If a machine is too expensive to repair, it is destroyed. This leads into the economic definition, which has dire moral consequences indeed. Some have defined humans in terms of their components. For example, since the component parts of humans include the ingredients for soap, the Nazis actually used human body parts to make soap. A Rabbinic midrash on the Biblical story of the Tower of Babel anticipated the problems of the economic definition. The question posed was, what was the sin of the Tower of Babel? The answer was, the cheapening of human life. After the tower was 70 miles high, when a worker fell nobody noticed, but when brick fell they cried and said “who will replace the brick?”[8]
III. It must conform to the qualifications of a definition. That is, it must be true of all past, present, and future examples. The zoological definition proves problematic in light of this criterion. Is the human being only rational and nothing else? What about when we are not at our best and are behaving less than entirely rationally? Do humans even meet this definition sufficiently? Bertrand Russell, in his memoirs, said he had accepted the definition of a human as a “rational animal” all his life, but that he had “never met one.” What about the human as a “tool-making animal?” Are humans still human if they do not make tools? And how are they different from beavers or chimpanzees, which can also make tools? What about the human as a “speaking animal?” What about humans who can’t speak? And how are they different from gorillas which have been taught International Sign Language?
I urge the court not to accept the zoological, mechanical, or economic definitions of the human being, as these definitions are found to be problematic when viewed in light of these three criteria. Furthermore, these definitions are reductionistic, taking one characteristic of humans and defining humans completely in terms of that characteristic.[9] Indeed, these definitions follow two great compulsions of Western thought: to define everything, and to think we understand things once we’ve defined them.[10]
Speaking again from the standpoint of Jewish Theology, I would like to offer an alternative to the reductionistic trap of the zoological, mechanistic, and economic definitions of humankind. It is the age-old tradition of Hebrew thought which describes humans rather than defining them, and sees things in terms of composites of complementary polar opposites rather than as reductionistic definitions. You see, whereas Western thought begins with the noun, and the question, “What is a human being?” Hebrew thought begins with the verb, and the question “What is being human?”[11] The answer is given, not in terms of a singular definition, but description in terms of complementary polar opposites. Genesis 1:27 says, “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.” Genesis 2:7 says “the LORD God formed man of dust from the ground,” and in Genesis 18:27 Abraham says he is “but dust and ashes.” Humans were “made of arid dust, the stuff of the desert, which is both abundant and worthless.”[12] Made in the image of God, and made of dust; sharply contrasting, yet both are true. A passage in the Talmud, the great body of Rabbinic writings from the early centuries C.E., speaks of humans as a composite of the “animal and angelic.” Like animals, humans eat, propagate, and die. Like angels, humans can pray, think, and speak Hebrew – a truly angelic thing in the eyes of the Rabbinic writer! Note how the animal characteristics of humans are affirmed without denying that we are more than animals. Note how the human faculty of speech is affirmed and described without defining humans only in those terms.
In conclusion, I urge the court to follow the precedent of Hebrew thought in its decision. The animal side of humans can be described without reducing humans to animals. The mechanical side of humans can be described without reducing humans to machines. Even the economic worth of a worker’s labor can be described without reducing the worker to an economic commodity, but instead affirming his or her true value and dignity as a sacred being, one formed of dust, made in the image of God; an animal who is also an angel.
[1] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology (Chicago: Spertus Institute of Jewish Studies, 1995), Course lectures on videocassette, Topic #7, cassette #12.
[2] Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Man a Machine [http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/LaMettrie/Machine/], 1748.
[3] Robert G. Ingersoll, The Gods [http://www.payer.de/religionskritik/ingersoll1.htm], 1872.
[4] Quoted by Byron L. Sherwin in Jewish Theology (Chicago: Spertus Institute of Jewish Studies, 1995), Course lectures on videocassette, Topic #7, cassette 12.
[5] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology , Topic #7, cassette #12.
[6] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology, Topic #7, cassettes 12 and 13.
[7] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology, Topic #7, cassette 12.
[8] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology, Topic #7, cassette #12.
[9] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology, Topic #7, cassette #12.
[10] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology, Topic #7, cassette #12.
[11] Byron L. Sherwin, Jewish Theology, Topic #7, cassette #12.
[12] Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Insecurity of Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966, pp. 150-167), reprinted in Jewish Theology: Background Readings (Chicago: Spertus Institute of Jewish Studies, 1995), 381.